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Bernard Gert's classic work Morality, in which he argues his distinctive and comprehensive moral theory, is now in its sixth edition. Gert argues that morality is an informal system that does not provide answers to every moral question but does always limit the range of morally acceptable options and so explains why some moral questions cannot be resolved. Gert shows the complex role that reasoning plays in moral decisions, and he illustrates how moral rules cannot be understood independently of the systems in which they are embedded. Although his moral theory is sophisticated, it is presented with a clarity that will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students alike, as well as anyone with a general interest in applied ethics.
In: Jones and Bartlett series in philosophy
This volume is a revised, enlarged, and broadened version of Gert's classic 1970 book, The Moral Rules. Advocating an approach he terms "morality as impartial rationality," Gert here presents a full discussion of his moral theory, adding a wealth of new illuminating detail to his analysis of the concepts--rationality/irrationality, good/evil, and impartiality--by which he defines morality. He constructs a "moral system" that includes rules prohibiting the kinds of actions that cause evil, procedures for determining when violation of the rules is permitted, and ideals which encourage actions that prevent or relieve suffering. To be valid, Gert argues, any such system must be "a public system that applies to all rational persons." The book concludes with a discussion of medical ethics, demonstrating the link between moral theory and its application to real moral problems
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 18-19
ISSN: 1467-9833
In: Hobbes studies, Band 14, Heft 1, S. 40-58
ISSN: 1875-0257
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 30, Heft 3, S. 379-386
ISSN: 1467-9833
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 34-46
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
I provide an account of irrationality that takes the concept of an irrational action as more basic than that of an irrational belief. While explaining the various elements of the OSM-III-R definition of mental disorders, I show that even though ( 1) not all mental disorders involve irrational beliefs or delusions, (2) not all irrational actions are due to mental disorders, and (3) not all mental disorders lead to irrational actions, there is a close conceptual connection between irrationality and mental disorders because both involve suffering or an increased risk of suffering an evil or harm, independent of the circumstances one is in.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 80, Heft 2, S. 201-222
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 504, Heft 1, S. 130-131
ISSN: 1552-3349
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 159-163
ISSN: 1552-7476
In: Hobbes studies, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 26-44
ISSN: 1875-0257
AbstractAlthough Hobbes talks about the laws of nature as prescribing the virtues, it is easier to think of them as proscribing the vices. The nine vices that are proscribed by the laws of nature are injustice, ingratitude, greed or inhumanity, vindictiveness (Hobbes does not name the vice corresponding to mercy, this is my attempt to provide one.), cruelty, incivility or contumely, pride, arrogance, and unfairness (I take this to be the vice corresponding to equity). The corresponding virtues that are prescribed by the laws of nature are justice, gratitude, humanity or complaisance, mercy, (Hobbes does not give, and I do not know what would count as, the virtue corresponding to his account of cruelty), civility, humility, (Hobbes uses this as one of the names for the virtue corresponding to the vice of arrogance, but I am using it as the opposite of pride.), modesty, and equity. The difficulty of coming up with names for some of the virtues, and even for some of the vices, shows that they are not all among the most common moral virtues and vices. Nonetheless, as described by Hobbes, they are genuine moral virtues and vices, traits of character such that all impartial rational persons would favor everyone having the virtues and no one having the vices. All of these virtues are such that they benefit everyone impartially by promoting peace, and are not primarily of benefit to the person having them. This is what makes them moral virtues and distinguishes them from the personal virtues of courage, prudence, and temperance. (See H, XIII, 9) The laws of nature are the dictates "of right reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members, as much as in us lies." (C, II, 1; see also L, XIV, 3) But the law of nature "dictating peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes;" (L, XV, 34; see also C, III, 32) is also the moral law because "in the means to peace, [it] commands also good manners, or the practice of virtue; and therefore it is called moral." (C, III, 31; see also L, XV, 40) Hobbes correctly sees both that peace benefits all persons impartially and that impartiality is essential to morality. His account of the moral virtues correctly makes them traits of character that would be favored by all impartial persons. His argument for the rationality of these moral virtues is that one's self-interest, which for Hobbes is primarily one's long-term preservation, is enhanced by having these virtues. There is no incompatibility between morality and self-interest as long as what is in one's own self-interest is equally in the interest of everyone else. Hobbes sees this point quite clearly and it is at the heart of his justification of the moral virtues.